Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review
Volume 19 | Issue 2

Article 6

Now is That What I Call Music?: Post-modern
Classical Music and Copyright Law
Jamie M. Yu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
Repository Citation
Jamie M. Yu, Now is That What I Call Music?: Post-modern Classical Music and Copyright Law, 19 Marq. Intellectual Property L. Rev.
269 (2015).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol19/iss2/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

YU FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/11/2015 11:12 AM

COMMENTS
Now Is That What I Call Music?: Post-modern Classical
Music and Copyright Law
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 273
I.“MUSICAL WORKS” AND COPYRIGHT PROTECTION ................................... 274
A. Current Copyright Protections ....................................................... 274
B. History of Copyright Protections for Musical Works .................. 276
C. Current Methods of Interpretation of “Musical Works” and
Copyrightability ........................................................................... 278
1. The Compendium’s definition of “music” is overly
restrictive and contravenes with evolving notions of
music. .................................................................................... 278
2. Judicial Treatment of the Copyrightability of Music............... 281
D. The Evolution of Classical Music in the Post-20th Century
Era 283
1. Comparing Modern Classical Music with Traditional
Classical Music ..................................................................... 286
E. Solution .......................................................................................... 287
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 288

YU FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

270

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

5/11/2015 11:12 AM

[Vol. 19:2

YU FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/11/2015 11:12 AM

2015] POST-MODERN CLASSICAL MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT LAW

271

Jamie Yu is a third-year student at Marquette University Law School,
with an interest in securities law and intellectual property law, particularly in
the realm of copyrights and trademarks. At Marquette, Jamie is the editor-inchief of the Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review and also serves as an
Academic Success Program leader, an admissions ambassador, and a Student
Bar Association student mentor. She has also interned in the legal department
at Robert W. Baird & Co. Incorporated, a Milwaukee-based financial services
firm, throughout her time in law school, where she will begin as a staff
attorney in the summer of 2015.
Prior to law school, Jamie attended Case Western Reserve University
in Cleveland, Ohio, where she graduated in 2009 as a double major in
political science and international studies, with a minor in economics. After
college, Jamie spent three years in Taiwan as a legal assistant and translator at
a touch panel manufacturing company in Hsinchu Science and Industrial Park.
In her spare time, Jamie enjoys long distance running, reading,
baking, spending time with family and friends, and music.

YU FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

272

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

5/11/2015 11:12 AM

[Vol. 19:2

YU FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/11/2015 11:12 AM

2015] POST-MODERN CLASSICAL MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT LAW

273

INTRODUCTION
Imagine a tennis court during a Grand Slam championship. The court
reverberates with the cacophony of the players hitting the ball, the squeak of
tennis shoes, and the patter of running footsteps. Is it music? While many
would argue that it is not, in fact, LCD Soundsystem’s James Murphy
collaborated with IBM to create music from those very sounds during the
2014 U.S. Open.1 From its humble beginnings in the Paleolithic flutes of the
prehistoric era,2 through the opera halls of Europe,3 to the avant-garde
creations of the post-modern era, composers have attempted to express the
purest of human emotions through musical expression. Music has the ability
to cross cultural barriers and, in a way, is one of the true universal languages.
While music is a universally accepted and appreciated art form, its protections
under intellectual property law could hardly be considered “harmonious” and
have bedeviled both composers and copyright lawyers alike.
Stemming from the first law granting protection to artistic expression,
intellectual property law has struggled to grant musical works the same types
of protection as other classes of protectable subject matter. As a consequence,
what protection musical works do enjoy at the moment is dulled by the fact
that those very protections were created while underestimating the ability of
composers to challenge traditional notions of music. By basing copyright
protection for musical works in traditional notions of music and musical
composition, the law leaves gaps where composers of more modern works run
the risk of not receiving the protection granted to their more traditional
counterparts because their works do not fit the overly-narrow definition of
“musical work” used by the Copyright Office.
This comment will discuss the issues with the evolution of classical music
in the late-20th and early 21st centuries and traditional definitions of “musical
works” as used in Section 102 of the Copyright Act. Section 102 of the
Copyright Act of 1976 clearly states that “musical works” are among the class
of creative works that are granted copyright protection.4 However, Section
101 does not define a “musical work”5 and as a result, the Copyright Office

1. Sonia Saraiya, Here Are Some of the Songs James Murphy Made From U.S. Open Matches,
A.V. CLUB (Sept. 11, 2014, 9:41 A.M.), http://www.avclub.com/article/here-are-some-songs-jamesmurphy-made-us-open-matc-209109.
2. Earliest Music Instruments Found, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment18196349 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
3. See History of Classical Music, NAXOS, http://www.naxos.com/education/brief_history.asp
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014). The late-romantic era of classical music was distinguished by attaching
“story-lines” to music.
4. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
5. See id. § 101.
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relies on the definition of “musical work” found in its internal manual to
discern whether a musical work warrants copyright protection. An overly
narrow definition of the term “musical work” that does not take into account
changing styles of classically music could lead to a class of composers not
being afforded their rightful copyright protection.
First, I will present a brief overview of copyright protections extended to
music. Then, I will examine the Copyright Office’s reliance on the
Compendium’s definition of “musical work” and highlight the issues that the
definition presents to the evolution of music. Next, I will examine the
evolution of classical music after the 20th Century and its shift away from
traditional connotations of musical composition and how this shift
contravenes with the Compendium definition of music, including a
comparison between traditional classical music and modern era classical
music, which highlights these changes. Finally, I will outline a solution to the
Compendium’s overly narrow definition of “musical work” in order to
encompass a wider spectrum of musical works that deserve copyright
protection and suggest that the Copyright Office weigh the elements of music
equally, as well as utilizing the Compendium definition of “musical work” as
a guideline, so as not to overly rely on a elemental analysis of a musical work.
In expanding the definition of “musical work” and weighing the elements of
music equally, composers whose works may not have been copyrightable will
enjoy the full protections and exclusive rights that are associated with
copyright.
I.

“MUSICAL WORKS” AND COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

Musical works have had a somewhat colorful history under the copyright
law. While musical works are currently protected under the copyright law6,
this protection came about after several revisions of the Copyright Act.7 The
Act’s failure to define the term “musical work” has led to the Copyright
Office adopting its own internal definition of the term. However, this
definition is limiting and, with the evolution of music and composition
techniques, could potentially raise issues of barring otherwise copyrightable
musical works from receiving the protection that they deserve.
A. Current Copyright Protections
This section will discuss the current protections that musical works enjoy
under the Copyright Act of 1976. For a work to be protected under copyright
laws, the work must satisfy three elements: (1) it must be original, (2) it must
6. See id. § 102.
7. It was not until 1831 that musical works received copyright protection.
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be fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and (3) it must be a protected
subject matter under Section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976.8 Although
originality is not defined in the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court in Feist
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service concluded that a work is original if it
possesses independent expression of an author that expresses a modicum of
creativity.9 The creativity requirement under copyright validity stems from a
requirement that comes from the textual references in the Copyright Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.10 A work is tangible for purposes of the 1976 Act if it is
“fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which [it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or through the aid of a machine or device.”11
Congress purposely drafted the language of the fixation requirement of
Section 102(a) in a broad manner so as to encompass technologies that were
not in existence at the time of the 1976 Act and to avoid largely unjustifiable
distinctions between the form of fixation of a work, meaning the way in
which the work was fixed.12 In the context of musical works, a composer
could likely fulfill this by using sheet music, recording it, or storing it on a
computer.13 Under Section 101 of the Copyright Act, a work is fixed “when
its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than a transitory
duration.”14 Under Section 102 of the Copyright Act, “musical works” are
clearly listed as one of the classes of creative works that are granted
protection under copyright law.15 While an understanding of the elements of
copyrightability in relation to musical works is critical to recognizing the
8. See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Copyright Act of 1976 §102.
9. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citing M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01 [A], [B]
(1990)).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (empowering Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective . . . Discoveries.”)
11. Copyright Act of 1976 § 102(a).
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 53 (1976) reprinted in U.S.C.A.A.N. 5666-67. Congress
emphasized that the 1976 Act was not to differentiate between “the form, manner, or fixation” of the
work. Congress also explained the importance of the fixation requirement as a line of demarcation
between common law and statutory protection. “Unfixed” works, such as improvisational works or
unrecorded choreographic works, performances, or broadcasts can receive common law or statutory
protection under Section 301 of the Act, but may not receive Federal statutory protection under
Section 102.
13. Jon M. Garon, Copyright Basics for Musicians, GALLAGHER, CALLAHAN & GARTRELL,
S.C. (March 2009), http://www.gcglaw.com/resources/entertainment/music-copyright.html.
14. Copyright Act of 1976 § 101.
15. Id. § 102.

YU FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

276

5/11/2015 11:12 AM

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

[Vol. 19:2

dissonance between modern classical music and the notion of “musical
works” in copyright law, examining the history of copyright protections for
musical works demonstrates that current protections for musical works under
copyright law fail to harmonize with the innovative and avant-garde nature of
modern classical music.
B. History of Copyright Protections for Musical Works
While musical works currently enjoy protection under the 1976 Act, the
history leading up to this arguably insufficient protection reflects the tension
between musical works and copyright law. This section will discuss a history
of copyright protection for musical works, beginning with the birth of
copyright law in the United States and through the latest variation of the
Copyright Act. The history of copyright law in the United States shows that
from the beginning, Congress did not take into account the changing
landscape of music when drafting copyright laws and in fact, music has been
treated almost as secondary class of works as opposed to other types of
protected subject matter. As a result of this treatment, musical works are
protected in a way that potentially stymies artistic creativity in musical
composition.
It was not until the Copyright Act of 1831,16 which expanded the
Copyright Act of 1790 to include musical works, that U.S. copyright law
recognized that musical works warranted protection. However, the scope of
protection for musical works was limited because copyright protection
extended only to the reproduction rights for printed music.17 Under the
Copyright Act of 1909, the first major revision to the Copyright Act of 1790,
Section 5(e) states that “musical compositions” are among the class of work
that can be granted copyright registration.18 The 1909 Act expanded the world
of exclusive rights for copyright holders of musical works to performance
rights, arrangement rights, or setting the music or the melody to “any form of
record in which the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it
may be read or reproduced.”19 Furthermore, the 1909 Act created the first
compulsory mechanical license to allow people to create mechanical
reproductions (phonographs) of musical works without the consent of the
author of the work, provided that they adhered to the confines of the license.20

16. Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436 (1831).
17. Id.
18. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 § 5(e), repealed by Copyright
Act of 1976, supra note 4.
19. Id. § 1(e).
20. Id.
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While musical works have been contemplated as a protectable subject
matter under copyright law, a troubling aspect of U.S. copyright law is that
the term “musical works” has never been explicitly defined. In fact, in the
House report detailing the debate surrounding the adoption of the 1976 Act,
Congress merely glossed over the category of musical works, arguing that
“musical works,” along with dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic
works, have a fairly settled meaning and thus, do not require a more specific
definition.21 In the House Report, the court justified not defining musical
works because with the 1976 Act, the form of the work is not significant.22
Even more problematic is in the same report, Congress reasoned that the four
terms defined in Section 101 of the 1976 Act23 purportedly required
definitions, “not only because the meaning of the term itself is unsettled but
also because the distinction between ‘work’ and ‘material object’ requires
clarification.”24 Furthermore, Congress expounded on the reasoning for
defining “literary works,” stating that the term “does not connote any criterion
of literary merit or qualitative value: it includes catalogs, directories, and
similar factual, reference, or instructional works and compilations of data.”25
It is unclear as to how a musical work has a fairly settled meaning while a
literary work, one of the four terms defined in Section 101 of the 1976 Act,
does not warrant such cavalier treatment. Contrary to Congress’ reasoning, a
musical work does not automatically connote any artistic merit, because
music is such an inherently subjective form of expression. A glimpse at the
evolution of classical music, which I will discuss below, shows that the
definition of a musical work is hardly “settled,” and that Congress was
shortsighted in treating music in such a glib manner. Music is a
quintessentially subjective form of artistic expression,26 one whose definition

21. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 12 at 53. In this Report, Congress seemed to
conclude that musical works, along with dramatic works and pantomimes and choreographic works
commonplace enough in society that further definitions were unnecessary. However, Congress’s
failure to define these categories of protectable subject matter has led to uncertainty as to whether
more modern forms of art are copyrightable. A particular example of the consequences of failing to
define certain types of protectable subject matter is the area of performance art. See David Bollier,
Performance Art as Property, COMMONS MAG. (Nov. 11, 2005), http://onthecommons.org
/performance-art-property.
22. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 12, at 53.
23. Copyright Act of 1976 § 101. The four terms are literary works; pictorial, sculptural and
graphic works (PSGs); motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and
architectural works.
24. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 12, at 54.
25. Id.
26. See Paul M. Grivinsky, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of the Intended
Audience in Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 395 (1992); David May, Note,
“So Long as Time Is Music”: When Musical Compositions are Substantially Similar, 60 S. CAL. L.
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is far from “fairly settled,” as Congress believes, and deserves further scrutiny
than the Congress’s cursory treatment. By not requiring a more specific
definition of “musical work,” Congress opened up a Pandora’s Box of
controversy as to what constitutes a musical work, as music styles have
changed over time.
Another potential consequence of Congress’s treatment of musical works
in the Copyright is that in doing so, Congress has potentially limited artistic
creativity by perpetuating what Professor Arewa calls a “visual-textual bias”
against musical creativity, which prevents copyright law from fully protecting
musical works and musical creativity.27 By visual-textual bias, Arewa posits
that because the drafters of the Copyright Acts framed the protections for
musical works under the influence of the notion of authorship in a literary
sense, creativity in the music area tends to focus on written aspects of music,
which in turn fails to include the full range of musical creativity.28 The visualtextual bias prevalent in copyright reduces an inherently nonvisual art form
(music) to its written representation.29 Arewa notes that this “reduction” is
particularly problematic in determining copyrightability of musical works,
because it “causes law to place music and interpretations of infringement in
cases involving music into a category analogous to legal documents,”30 which
almost applies a “four-corners” approach to musical compositions, not unlike
contract law. By focusing on written and visual aspects of musical works,
such an approach may hinder understanding of more modern approaches to
musical composition that do not subscribe to traditional composition
methods.31
C. Current Methods of Interpretation of “Musical Works” and
Copyrightability
1. The Compendium’s definition of “music” is overly restrictive and
contravenes with evolving notions of music.
The issues facing copyright law and music are further complicated by an
antiquated and overly simplistic definition of music used by the Copyright
REV. 785, 806 (1987) (“[M]usical expression produces value by virtue of its relationship to
nonmusical experience holds that the value musical expression produces, and the meaningful
experience it imparts, is uniquely aesthetic.”).
27. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Creativity, Improvisation, and Risk: Copyright and Musical
Innovation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1829, 1833 (2011).
28. Id.
29. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, A Musical Work is a Set of Instructions, 52 HOUS. L. REV.
467, 483 (2014).
30. Id.
31. Id.

YU FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/11/2015 11:12 AM

2015] POST-MODERN CLASSICAL MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT LAW

279

Office. While it is settled the musical works are a class of copyrightable
subject matter, where composers hit a “sour note” is in fulfilling the creativity
element of a valid copyright. Because the 1976 Act fails to define a “musical
work,” the Copyright Office relies on its internal manual, The Compendium
III: Copyright Office Practices, to provide guidance on defining music.32 At
the time I drafted this Comment, the third edition of the Compendium had not
been promulgated. Because of this, my initial examination of the internal
definition of “musical work” is based in the Compendium II: Copyright Office
Practices. However, discussing both editions of The Compendium provides
insight as to the developments that the Copyright Office has undertaken in
determining copyrightability of musical works.
Section 402 of the Compendium II defines music as a “succession of
pitches or rhythms, or both, usually in some definite pattern.”33 While this
definition seems fairly broad, the Compendium further defines music within
the scope of three required elements: (1) melody, or a succession of single
tones; (2) rhythm, or a grouping of pulses according to emphasis and length;
and (3) harmony, or the combination of different pitches.34 The Compendium
further narrows the definition of music by singling out the element of melody
as the determinative factor of whether a work is copyrightable.35 Furthermore,
the Compendium recognizes that “[s]tandard musical notation, using the fiveline four-space staff is the form most frequently employed to embody musical
works,”36 but also states that a musical work can be sufficiently “fixed” for
purposes of copyright if the work is embodied in the form of textual
instructions for performance, if it is specific enough to be performed.37
While the Copyright Office does not place a de minimis number of notes
or measures that automatically qualify a musical work for copyright,38 it is
clear from the text of the Compendium that the Office places a greater
emphasis existing notes and traditional notions of music in order to determine
copyright eligibility. The Copyright Office’s shortsighted emphasis on
melody as the predominant element in determining whether a musical work
32. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM III: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES (3d ed.
2014).
33. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 402 (2d ed.
1984).
34. Id. §§ 403-403.01.
35. Id. The Compendium further places an overemphasis on melody by stating that lack of
sufficient melody may be grounds for withholding copyright protection, if other elements, such as the
rhythm and harmony of the composition, supply all or substantially all of the copyrightable content
of the work.
36. Id. § 405.01(b).
37. Id.
38. Id. §§ 403-403.01.
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may receive copyright protection fails to take in to account changing
aesthetics of music.39 Admittedly, attempting to distill the definition of a
subjective art form, such as music, in to elements facilitates in providing an
objective system for determining copyright eligibility. However, the problem
with weighing certain so-called “elements,” such as melody, above other
aspects of music is that it automatically places works that may not have an
easily discernable melody, or may even have a complete lack of melody and
rely on other musical techniques, on a lower scale than those that fit within
more commonly accepted notions of music. Because of music’s inherently
expressive qualities, it “may not be a relational system symbolic of elements
in nonaesthetic experience, or primarily related to nonaesthetic value.”40
Unlike other types of protectable subject matter, such as literary works, the
inherently subjective qualities of music do not lend themselves to being
pigeonholed in black letter “elements” that overly restrict the definition of
music. Professor Arewa aptly sums up the dissonance between music and
copyright law in the following:
Music is inherently relational in its construction: the harmonic meaning of
a particular note or series of notes depends on the context of those notes. In
addition, music is typically related in some way to performance, which
distinguishes it from other types of cultural production, such as literature.
Music is often less representational than literature, which also strains the
relationship between copyright and music. The restricted nature of
the musical scale, limitations imposed by cultural and musical conventions,
the centrality of performance in music, and the nonrepresentational and
relational nature of music are all factors complicating the ease of translation
of literary copyright to the musical context.41

39. See Paul Théberge, Technology, Creative Practice and Copyright, in MUSIC AND
COPYRIGHT 139, 140 (Simon Firth & Lee Marshall eds., 2d ed. 2004) (“The origins of music
copyright law are rooted in a particular, restrictive notion of the musical work (defined as a
combination of melody and harmony) and its fixation in a graphic form (the musical score).”). See
also Jason Toynbee, Musicians, in MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT, id. at 125 (“Reducing music in copyright
to basic elements, most importantly melody and . . . words, made this process even more
straightforward.”).
40. May, supra note 26, at 807; see also Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004)
(The court analogized music with software programs and art projects, which are “not capable of
ready classification into only five or six constituent elements; music is comprised of a large array of
elements, some combination of which is protectable by copyright.”).
41. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and
Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 556-7 (2006); see also V. KOFI AGAWU, PLAYING WITH
SIGNS: A SEMIOTIC INTERPRETATION OF CLASSICAL MUSIC 15 (1991) (“Musicians are familiar with
[the concept of music as a relational system rather than a substantive one] from the system of
functional harmony, for example, by which a given note can take on different meanings depending
on the key in which it occurs, and, within that key, the actual chord within which it functions.”).
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On December 22, 2014, the Copyright Office promulgated the
Compendium III: Copyright Office Practices, revising the definition of
“musical works,” to be used by the Copyright Office.42 Notably, the new
version of the Compendium eliminates the singling out of “melody” as the
determinative factor to the copyrightability of a musical work.43 While this
most recent version of the Compendium signifies a greater sensitivity on the
part of the Copyright Office to unconventional composition practices and
forms of musical creation and is an improvement on the previous two versions
of the Compendium, this solution is unsatisfactory. By continuing to define
“musical works” using black-letter elements, the new Compendium runs the
risk of perpetuating the overly restrictive regime of copyrightability extended
to musical works as well as an over-reliance on Western notions of musical
composition.44
A more problematic issue with the Copyright Office’s usage of the
Compendium is that because the Compendium is an internal manual, it is not
binding and, unlike regulations, does not have the force of law.45 Since it is
an internal manual and is to be treated as guidance, the definitions in the
Compendium should be considered more as guidelines than as a binding
source. Furthermore, the fact that the Compendium has rarely been cited in
any court documents is indicative of the notion that the Compendium should
not be considered as heavily when determining the copyrightability of a
musical work, because its relative lack of weight should not pose a bar to the
granting of copyright protection.46
2. Judicial Treatment of the Copyrightability of Music
While there is precedent stating that rhythm and harmony may be
copyrightable in certain circumstances,47 the Compendium’s definition of
musical works fails to synchronize with this precedent by placing an over-

42. See COMPENDIUM III: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 32, § 802.1.
43. Id. §802.3.
44. See id. § 802.4(A) (In defining fixation for the purposes of musical works, the Copyright
Office continues to show a preference for the traditional, five-line, four-space staff commonly used
by Western composition methods).
45. See Kugel v. United States, 947 F.2d 1504, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
46. See Compendium II: Copyright Office Practices, IP MALL, http://www.ipmall.info
/hosted_resources/copyrightcompendium.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (“A Westlaw search . . .
shows citations by courts to the Compendium totaling less than fifty.”). This is in stark contrast to the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)’s Manual for Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) (also
an internal manual), which has been cited almost five hundred times.
47. See Levine v. McDonalds Corp., 735 F.Supp. 92, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (rhythm and
harmony can be copyrighted, even if the melody is monotonous repetition of one tone); Tempo
Music v. Famous Music, 838 F.Supp. 162, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

YU FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

282

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

5/11/2015 11:12 AM

[Vol. 19:2

emphasis on the element of melody. In Levine v. McDonalds Corp., the court
discussed the copyrightability of musical works and concluded that the use of
a minimal number of notes in a work containing substantial other musical
elements does not prevent a work from being copyrightable.48 In a subsequent
case, the court in Tempo Music v. Famous Music held that a per se standard
banning harmonies entirely from copyright protection would “be too broad
and would perhaps deprive appropriate protection to composition which
contains sufficient originality and creativity to warrant such protection.”49
However, most courts still resort to concluding that music consists of rhythm,
harmony, melody, and in some works, words.50 Furthermore, most courts are
still conservative in evaluating the elements of music separately,51 rarely
finding protectable expression in harmony, and continuing to place an overemphasis on melody. While progress has been made in a judicial broadening
of originality in music,52 courts are still mired in the traditional notions of
music expressed in melody, rhythm, and harmony, “notwithstanding
fundamental paradigm shifts over the last 100 years that have altered how
music is composed and enjoyed.”53
The Compendium’s treatment of musical works coupled with existing case

48. Levine, 735 F.Supp. at 99.
49. Tempo Music, 838 F.Supp. at 169; see Valeria M. Castanaro, “It’s the Same Old Song”:
The Failure of the Originality Requirement in Musical Copyright, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1271, 1281 (2008) (noting that “[t]his notion of originality fails to account for the
multitude of components that make up a musical work.”).
50. See Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 349 F.3d
591, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1740, 62 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1178 (9th Cir. 2003), opinion amended and
superseded on denial of reh’g, 388 F.3d 1189, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 388 F.3d
1189, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A musical composition consists of rhythm, harmony and
melody, and it is from these elements that originality is to be determined”); N. Music Corp. v. King
Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F.
Supp. 904, 913 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (“musical creation” consists of ”the grouping of notes, similarity of
bars, harmony or melody”).
51. See MARK S. LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 7.12 (2014).
52. See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004) (the Ninth Circuit observed that music
composed of other elements, such as pitch, tempo, phrasing, structure, and chord rhythms in addition
to the traditional three elements of melody, rhythm, and harmony); see also Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d
503 (6th Cir. 1999) (the lower court considered idea, phraseology, lyrics, chord progressions, and
other musical elements in determining whether a musical work was copyrightable); Erickson v.
Blake, 839 F. Supp.2d 1132, 1138-9 (D. Or. 2012) (stating that relevant elements that may be
examined in determining copyrightability of a musical work may include melody, harmony, rhythm,
pitch, tempo, phrasing, structure, chord progressions, “hooks,” instrumental figures, and overall song
structure.); Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F. 2d 718 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that
the copyrightability of the musical composition in question was not a four-note sequence, but the
fitting together of the sequence with other melodious phrases in a unique composition).
53. Alan Korn, Issues Facing Legal Practitioners in Measuring Substantiality of
Contemporary Musical Expression, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 489, 491 (2007).
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law reinforces the notion that copyright law in relation to musical works still
retains its bias towards traditional notions of classical music by emphasizing
an element-by-element analysis of copyrightability as well as a visual-textual
bias by favoring standard musical notation over more nonconventional, but
arguably still tangible, mediums of expression. The lack of consensus in past
precedent further supports the notion that courts also subscribe to a Westernbiased notion of musical composition and creativity.
D. The Evolution of Classical Music in the Post-20th Century Era
The evolution of classical music in the post-20th century era, particularly
with the rise of experimental music and other techniques that reject
commonly-accepted aspects of music, contravenes with the definition of a
“musical work” in the Compendium and has led to a class of musical works
that may be denied copyright protection because they do not strictly fall
within the definition used by the Copyright Office. This section will discuss
the evolution of classical music into the post-20th Century era and the issues
that modern classical music poses in respect to copyright law.
Before the 20th Century era of classical music, composers, starting from
the Classical era of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Joseph Haydn,
demonstrated adherence to a structural format to their works that provided
clarity to the listener.54 As the Classical era reached its heyday, early
Romantic era composers, such as Hector Berlioz, Frederic Chopin, Felix
Mendelssohn, Robert Schumann, Franz Liszt, and Giuseppe Verdi, began to
explore a balancing of expressive qualities of music with the more structural
qualities of music, using various techniques.55 However, with the turn of the
20th Century, composers began to move in different directions. Notably, a
hallmark of early 20th Century music was the beginning of breaking with
traditional notions of tonality that defined previous eras of classical music.56
This departure from traditional notions of tonality and harmony shocked
many for its stark contrast to the celebration of harmony that defined the
Romantic era.57 Arnold Schoenberg was particularly known for developing a
dodecaphony, or the twelve-tone system, that systematically used all twelve

54. History of Classical Music, NAXOS MUSIC LIBRARY, http://www.naxos.com/education
/brief_history.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). Classical era composers strove to move away from the
highly ornamental style of the Baroque era classical music of Bach and Vivaldi.
55. Id.
56. See Notes and Noise: Reassessing the Sound that was 20 th-Century Classical Music, THE
ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.economist.com/node/21569370/print.
57. See id. (“Experimenting with atonality, microtonality, electronic distortion of sound and
the role of chance: the developments favoured by the more innovative 20th-century composers do not
make for easy listening.”).
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notes of the chromatic scale, compared with the traditional seven-tone system
used by most classical composers.58 Soon after, many composers shifted
further away from the use of traditional Western notions of music, those upon
which copyright law is based, and began experimenting with less commonly
accepted musical techniques. Most notably, Igor Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring
both shocked and transformed the way that subsequent composers perceived
rhythm by frequent meter changes and unexpected accents.59
From the 1940s to the end of the 20th century, composers further pushed
the boundaries by experimenting with the lack of melody, or silence, in music.
Karlheinz Stockhausen endeavored into the world of electronic music and
pioneered two types of musical composition: aleatory in serial composition,
otherwise known as controlled chance, which allows the musician to choose
short phrases from a set list and play them in an arbitrary number of times;
and spatialization, which exploits the listener’s ability to locate sound.60
Composers also experimented with using different method to produce sounds,
such as using electronic music and using instruments in nontraditional matters
to emit sounds. With the turn of the 21st century, composers seem poised to
continue this trend of pushing the boundaries of acceptable music and to
further depart from the traditional elements of music used in copyright law.61
Composers such as John Zorn, Julian Andersen, and Tansy Davies have fused
classical music with other musical genres and practices in their works to
create new sounds.62 Indeed, it seems that in the 21st century, composers are
poised to blur the lines of music even further by leaving even more of the

58. See Robert Sherrane, Arnold Schoenberg & the Second Viennese School, MUSIC HISTORY
102, http://www.ipl.org/div/mushist/twen/schoenberg.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (“This method
involves the composer choosing a row consisting of all twelve notes, and then building the piece by
using the row, or sections of it, either melodically or harmonically, forward, backward, inverted, or
in retrograde inversion.”).
59. Tom Vitale, Then the Curtain Opened: The Bracing Impact of Stravinsky’s ‘Rite,’ NPR
(May 25, 2013 5:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/deceptivecadence/2013/05/25/186497792/thenthe-curtain-opened-the-bracing-impact-of-stravinskys-rite. (“It seems as though at first he’s going to
have this regular pulse. But then these accents start landing in unexpected places, and you can’t quite
get the pattern of it.”).
60. ROBIN MACONIE, OTHER PLANETS: THE MUSIC OF KARLHEINZ STOCKHAUSEN 296
(2006).
61. See Nick Shave, The Shape of Sounds to Come, BBC MUSIC MAG., 26-32 (October 2009).
The author interviewed ten composers to discuss trends in western classical music. The composers
came to the conclusion that music is too diverse to categorize or limit.
62. See Tom Service, Shuffle and Cut, THE GUARDIAN (Mar 6, 2003), http://www.
theguardian.com/music/2003/mar/07/classicalmusicandopera.artsfeatures; Julian Andersen, FABER
MUSIC, http://www.fabermusic.com/Composers-Details.aspx?composerid=13 (last visited Jan. 12,
2014); Tom Service, She’s Got the Funk, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 18, 2001),
http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2001/jun/18/artsfeatures.
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traditional rules of music behind.63
A particular growing trend in 21st century classical music is polystylism,
which combines elements of different music genres and compositional
techniques in one unified work.64 A particular issue that may arise with
polystylism is that composers may take aspects of different musical genres,
such as a melody from a rock and roll song that may not yet be in the public
domain, and incorporate it in to an original polystylist work. Because the
composer would be using a melody from a work that is not yet in the public
domain, the work would not be registerable, even if it fulfills the other
elements of a musical work. While the composer could potentially be able to
copyright the work as a derivative work under Section 103 of the 1976 Act, 65
provided that the composer received permission to use a portion of the
preexisting work, receiving such permission could prove to be an arduous
process, particularly with an original author who is reluctant to license his or
her work. This could potentially lead to a dwindling number of composers
who use polystylism to incorporate preexisting melodies into new works.
Furthermore, 21st-century composers have begun to further experiment
with serialism, which is a compositional technique that involves creating
music according to a series of values other than melody or harmony. 66
Serialism could potentially run afoul of the Copyright Office’s registration
practices, because if a composer uses a series of values (tones on the scale) as
the “melody” of the work, the office may consider the work to fail the ideaexpression dichotomy central to copyright law, as the office could equate the
series of values with facts, which would not be copyrightable under Section
102(b) of the Copyright Act.67
Another potential area of contemporary classical music that could
63. See Welcome to the 21st Century, Classical Music?, J CONCERT ARTISTS (May 11, 2013),
http://jconcertartists.com/welcome-to-the-21st-century-classical-music/ (Discussing the current
trends in 21st century classical music and concludes that because so many traditions and rules of
classical music were done away with in the 20 th century, it is hard to tell where classical music is
headed next, but that composers seem to be in a “musical free for all, where there are no rules, and
there can be very little judgment about what is good and what isn’t.”).
64. Id.
65. Copyright Act of 1976 § 103. Under this section, the copyright in the derivative work
would extend only to the original material contributed by the author, and would not extend to the
preexisting melody used in the work. Furthermore, the derivative work copyright would not extend to
any part of the work where the second author used preexisting copyrighted material.
66. See Anne Midgette, Contemporary Classical: A Primer, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug.
19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/contemporary-classical-a-primer/2011
/07/13/gIQAqhDDQJ_story.html. Serialist composers commonly use the twelve-tone scale
promulgated by Schoenberg and create musical phrases by combining all twelve notes of the
chromatic scale in a fixed order, and then use the phrase as a basis for the work.
67. Copyright Act of 1976 § 102(b).
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contravene with the Copyright Office’s definition of music would be the
increasing trend of aleatoric music, where the composer leaves some aspects
of the work up to chance, or a primary element of the composer’s work is left
to chance or the determination of the performers. The issue with this type of
music and the copyright office’s definition of a musical work is that because
some of the work is left to chance, the work may not be properly “fixed” in a
tangible meaning of expression if it is not recorded or left in sheet music.
Because an inherent quality of aleatoric music is that no two performances are
the same, similar to improvisational jazz music, a piece that is aleatoric in
nature and that uses the technique of silence could be denied copyright
registration for not fitting within the definition of musical works used by the
Copyright Office. Aleatoric music, along with the emergence of more modern
musical techniques, such as improvisation, emphasizes the clumsy fit of
copyright for musical techniques in the modern era.68
1. Comparing Modern Classical Music with Traditional Classical Music
The disconnect between modern classical music and copyright law is
highlighted by comparing a traditional classical piece with a modern classical
piece. A recent example of modern classical music is particularly
demonstrative of this difference is the music of Terje Isungset.69 Isungset is
known for creating “ice music,” meaning music made on instruments
primarily constructed out of ice. Because of the constantly changing nature of
the medium on which the music is performed,70 the music, however
aesthetically pleasing it may be, could fail the elements test for
copyrightability that is used by the Copyright Office because it may not have
a discernable melody. Furthermore, because of the inability for the piece to be
replicated, due to the fact that ice never melts at the same frequency and
because Isungset’s music requires an element of improvisation,71 its copyright
protections as a musical work would only extend to the material submitted to
the Copyright Office.72 Even if Isungset “fixed” his work by recording it, the
68. See Arewa, supra note 27, at 1843.
69. See Norwegian Festival Shows Off the Musicality of Ice, NPR (Jan. 21, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/2014/01/21/264399959/ice-musical-festival.
70. Id. (Noting “[y]ou cannot go on stage and expect a certain sound. You have to play with
the sound that instrument actually can make. And then try to create good music out of this.”).
71. See Turning a Glacier Into a Tuba: Ice Music from Norway, NPR (Feb. 24, 2013),
http://www.npr.org/2013/02/24/172818754/turning-a-glacier-into-a-tuba-ice-music-from-norway
(“Quite often, I don’t actually know how my instrument will sound. So I just have to listen to the
sound that is being created and try to create music out of this sound . . . .”).
72. See COMPENDIUM III: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 32, §802.4
(“Improvised works are not registrable unless they are fixed in a tangible form, such as in a
transcribed copy, a phonorecord, or an audiovisual recording. A registration for an improvised
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fact that the piece would never be able to be repeated again, due to the fact
that the frequency at which the ice melts would be nearly impossible to
replicate, would mean that Isungset would only receive protection for the
sound recording of the work that he submitted, rather than the composition
itself because it would not be able to be replicated.
In contrast to Isungset’s work, Ludwig von Beethoven’s Symphony No.
73
9, arguably one of the most influential pieces of classical music ever
composed,74 utilizes quintessential musical techniques that are commonly
accepted under copyright law. In Symphony No. 9, Beethoven seemed to
capture the creation of the world, spiritual enlightenment, and the joy of
humankind all in one piece.75 Unlike Isungset’s ice music, Beethoven’s work,
though far more expressive than many of his fellow composers, has a
discernable melody that is “fixed” by notation onto a traditional five-line fourspace music staff. Furthermore, although both Isungset and Beethoven’s
pieces are played on musical instruments, Beethoven’s work involves no
improvisation and can be easily replicated by orchestras around the world.
Beethoven’s work would easily withstand the Compendium’s definition of
music, because it satisfies the three-element definition of music (melody,
rhythm, and harmony) and is fixated in a commonly accepted form.. Unlike
Beethoven, Isungset’s ice music, because it relies heavily on improvisation
and the nature of the instrument at the moment, may not as easily withstand
scrutiny. However, an artist like Isungset, whose creations may not fall within
the strict bounds of commonly accepted notions of musical works but clearly
show creativity and artistic merit, should not be precluded from gaining
protection for his creative expression.
E. Solution
It seems clear from the trajectory of classical music that the definition of
“musical work” used in the Compendium is antiquated and remains in the era
of music where artists conformed to traditional ideas of music. I would
suggest weighing the elements of music equally, thereby removing the
emphasis on melody from the definition, in order to encompass a broader
class of musical works that would not have otherwise received registration.
Furthermore, because of the inherently aesthetic and subjective quality of
musical work will extend only to the material that has been submitted to the Office.”).
73. Tom Service, Symphony Guide: Beethoven’s Ninth (‘Choral’), THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 9,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/music/tomserviceblog/2014/sep/09/symphony-guide-beethovenninth-choral-tom-service.
74. Christopher H. Gibbs, Notes on Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, NPR (Jun. 13, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5487727.
75. Id.
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music, as discussed above, I would propose using the definition of musical
works in the Compendium as a guideline, rather than as a strict definition, in
order to protect future generations of classical music composers who will
continue to push the boundaries and the average listener’s perception of
music. By reforming the definition of musical works utilized by the Copyright
Office, courts will be more receptive to broadening their understanding of
originality in music. As a result, composers that may not have been able to
receive copyright protection for their compositions due to failing to meet the
more narrow requirement for originality in music will be able to receive
protection for their works under a broader definition of originality in the
scope of musical works.
CONCLUSION
Classical music has evolved and grown from the highly formalized
Baroque era to the arguable lack of form that defines the 20th century era.
What paths contemporary music will take remain to be seen, but it is clear that
the current definition used to determine copyright eligibility for musical
works is antiquated and “fails to account for unique methods of musical
expression that exist beyond those narrowly drawn boundaries.”76 By
broadening the definition of “musical work” used in the Compendium and deemphasizing melody’s importance over the other two elements of music,
composers can rest easy, knowing that they can create new and original
compositions that will receive the protection they deserve.
JAMIE M. YU*

76. Korn, supra note 53, at 490.
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